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Abstract 
 
 
Purpose – This paper uses a combination of transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource-
based view (RBV) and the relational view to analyse vertical integration in the rail sector, 
through which rail wagons are viewed as “relationship specific assets”. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The empirical analysis is based on a cross-case 
comparison of four case studies of intermodal operators in Europe, each exhibiting different 
levels of collaboration and integration between terminals, operators and sub-contractors. 
 
Findings – Viewing rail wagons as relationship specific assets rather than merely transaction 
specific (TCE) or firm specific (RBV) demonstrates that wagon ownership is not only a good 
indicator of the level of vertical cooperation but of the existence of trust and learning within a 
collaborative environment. 
 
Practical implications – the organisational setup is not derived purely from transaction or 
resource characteristics, but by the integration of processes through the purchase of assets 
that will be used to produce a service, with the expected levels of trust and commitment. In 
this sense, the role of the wagon as a relationship specific asset is a microcosm of the key 
elements of a successful intermodal transport system. 
 
Originality/value – As one of the key operational aspects of the rail sector is the use of 
expensive equipment and the relative responsibility for fixed and moveable assets, an 
analysis of the use of rail wagons as relationship specific assets allows a more dynamic 
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understanding of vertical integration in the rail sector than currently provided by TCE or 
RBV alone. 
 
Keywords – business model, governance, intermodal freight transport, institutions, 
transaction cost economics (TCE), resource-based view (RBV), relational view 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines vertical integration in the intermodal rail sector. The first aim is to 
understand the process of integration between rail service providers and rail terminal 
operators, as part of a deeper understanding of how to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of intermodal transport. Rather than focusing solely on the organisational 
aspects of firm integration, the paper looks at the operational procedures, namely the 
integration of locomotive and wagon ownership, operation and maintenance through which 
the integrated organisation operates.  
From a theoretical perspective, the paper makes use of transaction cost economics (TCE), 
the resource-based view (RBV) and the relational view. A supplementary aim of the paper is 
therefore to examine the relative merits of these three theories in explaining why and how a 
firm chooses to integrate with another. It is the contention of this paper that the question can 
be understood more dynamically by combining TCE and RBV via the relational view. This 
paper therefore builds on earlier research by looking at a specific dimension, in particular the 
role of “relationship specific assets.” As one of the key operational aspects of the rail sector is 
the use of expensive equipment and the relative responsibility for fixed and moveable assets, 
an analysis of the use of rail wagons can shed important light on these discussions. 
 
2. Vertical integration in the intermodal sector 
An intermodal transport chain requires the participation of many classes of stakeholder 
who need to work together, and these relationships can be managed under different kinds of 
agreements, with greater or lesser levels of collaboration and integration. The physical 
transport unit, usually a container, swap body or semi-trailer, moves along a transport chain 
from shipping line to port terminal operator to the traction provider to the inland intermodal 
terminal operator, then the last mile is done by truck to the shipper. Such chains also operate 
in reverse, and if the journey does not require a sea journey then the port terminal is replaced 
by another inland terminal. 
Moreover, just like the port terminal, a rail terminal may have an operator as well as an 
owner (equivalent to the port authority) and provide associated services requiring the 
involvement of other public organisations, e.g. customs and inspection services (Bergqvist & 
Monios, 2014; Monios & Bergqvist, 2014; Bergqvist, Falkemark & Woxenius, 2010). 
Overlaying these physical handling operations is the administrative role played by the rail 
operator managing the chain. In some cases the rail operator is the same as the traction 
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provider and in other cases it is different. Likewise, in some cases the rail operator may be 
the same company as the terminal operator, or there may even be a vertically integrated chain 
encompassing the port, the rail operator and the inland terminal (e.g. HHLA Hamburg), or, 
even more rarely, that integrated chain may also include the shipping line; for example when 
Maersk was running not only vessels and port terminals but inland rail and terminals. They 
have now divested themselves of this inland operation (Monios, 2014).  
In addition to the vertical perspective, there exists also the potential for horizontal 
collaboration. This is common with shipping lines merging or sharing slots, and in the 
hinterland it could potentially involve rail operators working together or, more likely, 
aggregators like 3PLs bringing shippers together to consolidate flows and fill trains (Monios, 
2015; Bergqvist, 2008). 
The need to conceptualise and understand different ways and differing levels of formality 
in the coordination of hinterland transport has given rise to institutional analyses of these 
organisational structures. New institutional economics (NIE) has been used to explore 
different methods of coordinating hinterland transport chains (e.g. Panayides, 2002; de 
Langen & Chouly, 2004; Van der Horst & de Langen, 2008; Van der Horst & Van der Lugt, 
2009; Franc & Van der Horst, 2010; Monios & Lambert, 2013; Van der Horst & Van der 
Lugt, 2014). Van der Horst and de Langen (2008) identified four main arrangements for 
coordinating hinterland transport chains: the introduction of incentives, the creation of an 
interfirm alliance, changing the scope of the organisation and collective action. The paper 
highlights five reasons why coordination problems exist: unequal distribution of costs and 
benefits, lack of resources or willingness to invest, strategic considerations, lack of a 
dominant firm, risk-averse behaviour/short-term focus.  
Van der Horst & Van der Lugt (2009, 2014) built on the preceding work in institutional 
economics by Van der Horst and De Langen (2008), making use of a theoretical framework 
called the 3-Layer Scheme developed by Williamson (1996). This approach highlights the 
importance of the institutional environment in the development of hinterland coordination 
arrangements. The common link with these approaches is that they are based primarily on 
TCE and organisational structure, with some use of RBV. These approaches will be discussed 
in detail in the following section. 
 
3. Conceptual approaches – TCE, RBV and the relational view 
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Much theory in logistics has been derived from older disciplines, particularly economics 
(Stock, 1997). In an inventory of theory in logistics and supply chain management research, 
Defee et al. (2010) found that almost 20 per cent of all theory use related to transaction cost 
approaches (TCE) and resource-based view (RBV). Both of these approaches can help 
understand why and how individual organisations choose a particular level of integration. 
TCE is a framework for understanding when a firm should internalise transactions, i.e. 
integrate or operate through contracts, “make or buy” (Williamson, 1975, 1985), or, more 
simply, why firms exist at all. It is derived from Coase’s (1937) work on transaction costs, 
which need to be analysed in order to decide under which arrangement they will be 
minimised. These costs include information costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs 
(Williamson, 1985). The transactions can also be assessed by their frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity. If transaction costs are considered high due to high uncertainty and high 
asset specificity, then TCE recommends vertical integration or internalisation of the 
transaction, also referred to as a hierarchy rather than a market. On the other hand, if 
transaction costs are low because asset specificity is low, TCE recommends outsourcing 
through contracts; for example, transport services are fairly generic. In the case of intermodal 
transport, it could be argued that asset specificity is high due to the specialised equipment and 
expertise, but it depends somewhat on whether there is a high degree of competition on a 
particular route, thus making transport provision more easily interchangeable. It has been 
suggested that, beyond the initial “make or buy” or outsourcing decision, the TCE theory 
does not cover evolving, dynamic relationships (Wilding & Humphries, 2006), or the 
relational costs paid by the partner firms to cover the uncertainties in the partnership, aiming 
for indirect positive outcomes from intangible assets and corporate social capital (Todeva & 
Knoke, 2005).  
RBV is based on obtaining competitive advantage through the exploitation of resources 
within the firm (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and, increasingly, across all 
actors in a supply chain (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Peters et al., 2011; Schmoltzi & 
Wallenburg, 2011). Following an RBV approach, having more partners in the cooperation 
agreement provides more resources from which to benefit, whereas according to TCE, 
communication and coordination become more complex as the number of firms increases 
(Schmoltzi & Wallenburg, 2011). According to Barney and Clark (2007) the resource should 
be valuable, rare, inimitable/non-substitutable and the firm must possess the organisational 
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capacity to obtain competitive advantage from the resource.
1
 Just as TCE predicts that high 
uncertainty leads to integration, RBV proposes that strategically valuable resources should be 
kept inside the firm.  
Several authors have combined both approaches. Franc and Van der Horst (2010) 
discussed the relationship between TCE and RBV in the way that the partners are dependent 
on unique resource configurations that have been developed in the collaboration. Hernández-
Espallardo et al. (2010) applied both TCE and RBV to supply chain governance, examining 
how TCE safeguards knowledge-sharing risks, while RBV coordinates learning within the 
supply chain. Similarly, Rollins et al. (2011) analysed customer knowledge sharing in 
logistics by applying the knowledge-based view, which is an extension of RBV that 
foregrounds knowledge as the most important resource.  Herz et al. (2013) used a combined 
framework of TCE and RBV to analyse a case of collaboration in the maritime logistics 
chain, concluding that the two approaches are mutually reinforcing. Madhok and Tallmann 
(1998) go further, suggesting that transaction costs are not separable from asset investments, 
and that trust as a major explanatory factor of why firms do not take advantage of their 
partners can be replaced by investments in future value, thus proposing a relationship 
between transaction specific assets (drawing on TCE) and firm specific assets (drawing on 
RBV). Their argument rests partly on the view that TCE accounts mostly for the potential 
value obtainable by entering an alliance, thus explaining the initial decision to adopt a new 
governance form, while RBV relates more closely to the actual relationship over time, thus 
relating to the actual realisation of that value and therefore an expectation of more to come. 
Dyer and Singh (1998) combined TCE and RBV into what they call the relational view, 
by exploring asset specificity in relationships between supply chain partners. One of their key 
concepts is the “relationship specific asset,” which can be a physical, human or technological 
resource. The two influences on the ability to generate rents from this asset are the processes 
for and length of safeguarding, and the ability to replace general purpose assets with more 
specific equipment that can increase efficiency, but this is generally only possible if a large 
number of transactions justifies the additional investment. 
 
4. The conceptual framework: rail wagons as relationship specific assets 
                                                 
1
 In the earlier formulation of Barney (1991), the four features of the resource were that it should be 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. 
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In this paper, the vertical integration process being explored is primarily that between the 
terminal and the services, and how these are linked by the use of wagon sets. Therefore, this 
section expands on the key features of vertical integration in intermodal transport from 
section 2 by describing the particular aspects of wagon ownership and operation that make 
them relationship specific assets. These features and then combined with the results of the 
literature review from section 3, which identified the key features of the three theories, in 
order to develop a conceptual framework for analysis of the different ways of treating wagon 
assets.  
The two influences on the ability to generate rents from relationship specific assets 
proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998) are present in the ownership of rail wagons. Like 
locomotives, they are relatively long-term investments that nonetheless can be sold to another 
operator if market conditions change and stock becomes surplus to requirements. Similarly, 
asset specificity with regard to rail wagons is not high, in the sense that all operators have 
them and they are interchangeable, subject to suitable sizes and compatibility with particular 
national infrastructure. However, an operator will need to make decisions for certain routes or 
flows; for example, low-deck wagons for physically constrained routes or shorter wagons for 
flows with a predominance of 45ft containers rather than multiples of 20ft common on port 
shuttles. The ability to match the right wagon to the right flow and maintain utilisation 
without wasted capacity is essential to the economic viability of intermodal transport 
(Woodburn, 2011; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2014). Therefore, the assets themselves are not 
fixed sources of competitive advantage but rather “quasi-fixed”, as the supply cannot be 
expanded immediately or rapidly (cf. Peteraf, 1993). 
According to Barney and Clark (2007) the resource should be valuable, rare, 
inimitable/non-substitutable and the firm must possess the organisational capacity to obtain 
competitive advantage from the resource. Rail wagons are valuable, but not in comparison to 
the key rail asset of locomotives. They are not particularly rare or inimitable in themselves, 
except in certain times and places; for example, whether an operator has the required wagons 
on hand or can acquire them when an opportunity arises with specific timetable and capacity 
requirements. Of major relevance for this research is the fourth criterion, as the subject of this 
paper is not the wagon per se but the decision of an operator to use their own wagon sets as a 
means of integrating the joint production of rail services and terminal operations.  
 The decision to lease or own wagons is a key strategic decision. Being able to exit an 
intermodal transport service quickly is one of the key reasons for leasing wagons instead of 
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ownership. Leasing wagons also establishes flexibility as to which wagons to use; if the 
operator is uncertain of the type and distribution of load units to use,, a leasing option makes 
switching wagons easier. Other influencing factors are the weight of containers that might 
require a set of wagons with more axles and reinforced frames, e.g. type SGNSS. However, if 
more wagons that can load heavier containers are used than necessary there is an unnecessary 
increase in maintenance costs. The most efficient setup is to use one single type of wagon for 
the whole wagon set. This makes unloading and loading easier as the operator does not need 
to consider questions such as where the heaviest containers should be loaded. However, such 
a strategy is more expensive, as wagons that can load heavier containers are generally more 
expensive and heavier themselves which might limit the loading capacity of the whole train 
as the locomotive has a particular traction power. Wagon leasing also includes maintenance, 
whereas owning the wagons requires the intermodal transport operator to contract an ECM 
(Entity in Charge of Maintenance) that then manages the scheduled maintenance as well as 
emergency repairs. 
 There are seven main factors influencing the choice of wagon ownership by the 
intermodal transport operator. (1) Gap in cost between the leasing and ownership option. (2) 
Level of long-term commitment and deployment of wagons on the same route over time. (3) 
The ownership option requires the owner to be able to set up and manage the rail wagon 
maintenance equally effectively and efficiently as the leasing option. This factor also relates 
to the possibility of increased integration into the transport chain by the use of technologies 
such as geo-fencing and the use of RFID for wagon maintenance monitoring and positioning. 
(4) Level of integration with terminal operators, i.e. understanding the importance of win-win 
relations in the terminal operation efficiency. (5) Possible and maybe favourable financing. 
(6) Stable goods flows where the level and characteristics of the flow do not change over 
time. (7) Sometimes there is a seventh factor derived from the tax advantages of over 
depreciation. A firm may depreciate an asset on its balance sheet in such a manner that the 
asset is recoded as being worth less than it would be if it were sold. This results in the firm 
understating its earnings and/or the value of its assets. 
The basis for analysis in this paper is to explore how the ownership and management of a 
set of wagons can be viewed as a relationship specific asset and how analysis of different 
models can contribute to the understanding of TCE and RBV, based on the key elements of 
each and the modified relational view as derived in the previous section (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Key features of TCE, RBV and the relational view 
 TCE RBV Relational view 
Way of obtaining 
competitive advantage 
 Reducing transaction 
costs 
 Exploiting resource 
heterogeneity of the firm  
 Exploiting resource 
heterogeneity of the 
inter-firm relationship 
What is required in order 
to obtain competitive 
advantage from an asset 
 High asset specificity  Valuable 
 Rare 
 Inimitable 
 Non-substitutable 
 Processes for and 
length of safeguarding 
 Ability to replace 
general purpose assets 
with more specific 
equipment that can 
increase efficiency 
Type of asset specificity  Transaction specific  Firm specific  Relationship specific 
When to integrate firms 
 
 High uncertainty 
 High asset specificity 
 High transaction 
frequency 
 When greater 
efficiency (and thus 
competitive advantage) 
can be obtained through 
the joint use of resources 
 When greater 
efficiency (and thus 
competitive advantage) 
can be obtained through 
the joint use of resources 
 
TCE supports vertical integration when uncertainty, asset specificity and transaction 
frequency are high, evidenced by regular problems coordinating intermodal shipments 
leading to delays, lack of reliability and frequency, but market transactions are recommended 
when these characteristics are low. RBV suggests vertical integration when greater efficiency 
and thus competitive advantage can be obtained through the use of resources such as assets or 
staff. Examples include not just economies of scale through increased firm size as a result of 
integration but economies of scope and density gained by the integration of two firms 
possessing unique resource configurations that then enable the provision of more than one 
kind of service as well as increasing asset utilisation by adding additional routes. In terms of 
strategy, TCE predicts that high uncertainty, asset specificity and transaction frequency leads 
to integration, while RBV proposes that strategically valuable resources should be kept inside 
the firm. These are the key factors that will form the basis of the analysis and discussion in 
this paper. 
 
5. Methodology 
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Barney (2001) discusses the pros and cons of parameterisation and empirical testing of a 
theory like RBV, but that is not the goal of this paper. The aim is rather to explore the process 
by which an asset is used as an enabler of collaboration and integration. The aim of this paper 
is therefore to investigate a “how” question (Yin, 2009), which will be explored through four 
qualitative case studies. A single-case design might analyse one of these cases as a 
“representative case” but under the multi-case design adopted for this paper they are used 
purposefully as “critical cases”, because, as representative of different types of development 
strategies, they can be used in conjunction to extend theory (Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2008).  
The goal of this paper is not simply the organisational coordination but the operational 
aspects. Therefore, the four cases were selected because they exhibit different models of 
operational integration through the use of fixed and moveable assets (Table 2). All four cases 
are based in Europe, where a variety of models are in evidence, compared to the intermodal 
network in other countries such as the United States where a handful of large vertically-
integrated companies compete against each other.  
 
Table 2. Key features of the four case companies 
 HUPAC PCC Intermodal Freightliner Ltd JULA & Schenker 
(specific joint 
venture) 
Founded 1967 2009 1996 2013 
Head office Switzerland Germany UK Sweden 
Company 
background 
Set up as umbrella 
company of road 
and rail operators 
Set up as subsidiary of 
chemical producer 
Management buyout 
of former national 
rail operator. Bulk 
business started in 
2000. 
Newly established 
cooperative joint 
venture on a specific 
route 
Country of 
operations 
Europe-wide Poland, Germany UK, Netherlands 
(intermodal) 
Sweden 
Staff 414 190 1,800 (across whole 
group) 
2,400 (all of JULA) 
Turnover 377m euro 178m PLN (42m euro) £250+m (across 
whole group) 
0.5bn euro (total for 
JULA) 
Traffic 
(trains) 
100 per day 200 per month 106 per day 5 per week 
Traffic (units 
p.a.) 
650,000 units 
(2012) 
151,131 TEU (2012) 700,000 containers 
(2013) 
15,000 TEU (2013) 
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Site visits were undertaken by the authors at company terminals where management and 
operational staff were interviewed and documentary information obtained, as well as 
providing the opportunity to view the operations and ask additional questions. Both the semi-
structured interviews and document analysis were used to obtain factual information about 
the business and operations, including company structure, portfolio of terminals and 
provision of services. After obtaining factual and practical information on the business, the 
main focus of the questionnaire was on the internal and external aspects of the business 
model. The former relates to the structure of operations, the levels of integration and 
ownership and the sharing of information relating to the services produced by the company. 
The latter covers the relationship with external organisations. The respondents were asked to 
describe the barriers overcome and benefits realised. More specifically, as the goal of the 
interviews was to understand how wagon assets are owned and used, the respondents were 
asked their reasons for choosing to purchase some assets and lease others, and the role played 
by sub-contractors in their business model. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing the 
conversation to range beyond the responses possible using a structured survey methodology 
(Given, 2008). It is recognised that response bias in interviews tends to result in a rational 
account of behaviour, thus potentially obscuring an important part of the process. This 
problem was reduced by not relying solely on interview results; these were triangulated with 
desktop research and document analysis to build case studies that could be compared. 
The first step was to review the interview and documentary data several times. The data 
were then organised and reduced by collating evidence in a matrix based on the conceptual 
framework, according to a three-stage process of data reduction, display and conclusion 
drawing and verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Aastrup and Halldórsson 2008; da 
Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012). Gaps in the matrix were identified and filled by follow-up emails 
as well as further data collection via desk research. An iterative process was followed, 
moving back and forth between data collection, analysis, interpretation and explanation, 
making use of triangulation to strengthen interpretations. In this way, the data were reduced 
into manageable sections, which then guided the presentation under headings and sub-
headings used in this paper, which are necessary for cross-case comparison 
 
6. Case studies 
6.1 HUPAC 
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6.1.1 Company background and structure 
The HUPAC group was formed in 1967 in Switzerland from partners engaged in road 
haulage in conjunction with Swiss Railways SBB, with a specific intention to focus on 
transalpine traffic. Currently, 72% of the shares are owned by transport and logistics 
companies and 28% are owned by rail operators. In 1970, HUPAC joined with other 
companies to create the umbrella group UIRR (Union Internationale de societies de transport 
combine Rail-Route). The interesting aspect of this partnership is that, in order to avoid 
competition between modes, the founding principle was that road operators should have the 
dominant voice in this consortium. This is related to HUPAC’s core business model of 
neutrality. 
The company structure is a group comprising 13 independent organisations. The separate 
operating company HUPAC Ltd deals with the customers and books the shipments. HUPAC 
companies within the group operate nine intermodal terminals (Busto Arsizio-Gallarate, 
Singen, Antwerp, Aarau, Basel, Chiasso, Piacenza, Lugano Vedeggio, Novara) and they also 
serve other terminals. 
 
6.1.2 Rail operations and business model 
The group currently operates around 100 trains per day and handles around 650,000 road 
consignments per year, almost double the level of a decade ago. They carry containers and 
swap bodies as well as semi-trailers on piggyback wagons. All the terminals they serve are 
linked by an ICT system that manages the shuttles and tracks the unit movements. 
HUPAC operates intermodal terminals and manages shuttles between all of these 
locations but they are not traction providers. HUPAC manage 5,166 wagons in total, of which 
the vast majority are owned, the remainder leased. HUPAC sets up the timetabled services, 
then runs tenders to sub-contract traction providers to provide the locomotive power to haul 
the shuttles between terminals. The first and last mile by road haulage is organised by the 
transport companies themselves rather than by HUPAC. 
Although they are not traction providers, they have shunting locos in the terminals. They 
also have a rail operation licence in Germany and Italy, and they do sometimes pull their own 
services for local shunting, e.g. from Busto Arsizio to Milan. But normally the external rail 
operator takes the wagon set from the gate. Handling containers at the terminal is their core 
business so they do not want to enter the traction market. Also, neutrality is one of the core 
principles and they do not want to change that by competing with rail operators. Bernhard 
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Kunz, director of the HUPAC group, says: “Entering the market on a grand scale ourselves is 
out of the question. But we are retaining our option to provide our own traction if there are no 
alternatives.”  
Onsite at Busto Arsizio they have a workshop and refurbishing centre. Using their own 
wagons means they can manage maintenance and safety checks without the delays of dealing 
with external organisations.  Having their own workshop also makes it easier to use fixed 
wagon sets as much as possible, especially with wagons of similar age and condition, to 
reduce having to remove wagons from a set for maintenance.  
Their main value-added is maintenance and repair, as they have their own repair centre. 
But they also provide additional small tasks such as for example checking dangerous goods 
labels on containers. They don’t get directly involved in logistics. Busto Arsizio is the only 
terminal in their network where they provide inland customs clearance. 
Next door to the Busto Arsizio terminal is a subsidiary 3PL called Fida Divisione 
Magazzini Generali. The company already existed before HUPAC came here but then 
HUPAC purchased the company. So some warehousing is available there but it is not really a 
direct strategy for feeding the terminal.  
The core business for HUPAC remains transalpine block trains but they recognise that the 
unique conditions in this market will not remain indefinitely, as subsidies for transalpine 
routes will be reduced due to the opening of the base tunnel through the alps. They are, 
therefore, highly motivated to develop their other intermodal routes. 
Their position in the market is to remain neutral with regard to transport operators. That is 
why their customers remain transport providers rather than shippers, therefore they do not 
compete for direct custom. Additionally, they do not compete with traction providers for rail 
operations. It is the core of their business model to retain this neutrality and continue to sub-
contract rail traction, even though they do run some short services themselves and they have 
licences to provide traction in two countries. 
 One change in their business model is that they are now focusing more on attracting 
smaller customers. This will diversify their traffic base and leave them less vulnerable to the 
loss of custom in future. 
There are loading gauge restrictions on the Italian network. It is not always the money 
that is the issue but the institutional difficulties involved in getting the permissions and 
agreements. In general, the infrastructure in Switzerland and Italy needs to be upgraded to the 
same profile as Netherlands, Germany and Belgium in order to maintain the corridor from 
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Northern Range ports to HUPAC’s heartland. This includes train length, weight and loading 
gauge profile. 
HUPAC is a big supporter of rail liberalisation and believes that it must be accelerated. 
Otherwise many operators are cross-subsidised by the national infrastructure operator and 
true competition is not possible. Their brochure states that “state grants are given to state-
owned railway companies in all sorts of different forms: through covering deficits, 
restructuring at no cost to the company, or credit guarantees.” 
 
6.1.3 Conclusions 
The HUPAC business model gives them the best of both worlds – they manage the 
wagons so they can control their equipment needs and ensure availability, but they don’t have 
the difficulties and risks of loco purchase and maintenance, training drivers, managing their 
hours, getting licences in each country and so on. There is an inherent limitation of using 
external traction in that it can limit flexibility, likewise with the use of third-party terminals, 
but this must be traded off against other factors. Another interesting aspect of the business 
model is that they have no involvement in logistics and no direct relationship with the 
shippers. This is good because of neutrality but it means they are one step removed from the 
market.  
 
6.2 PCC Intermodal 
6.2.1 Company background and structure 
The headquarters of the PCC group is located in Duisburg, Germany, and 2,000 staff are 
employed across the group. PCC Intermodal is one part of the group, the other activities 
being energy and chemicals. Their intermodal activity started in 2005 with shipments for the 
chemical production of the group, which made PCC the first private intermodal operator in 
the country. Today PCC Intermodal employs over 190 staff and runs over 200 trains per 
month, handling around 8,000 containers. In 2012, total throughput was 151,131 TEU, an 
increase of 26% on the year before. The company is owned 62% by the PCC group, 14% by 
rail operator DB Schenker and national rail infrastructure owner Rail Polska and 24% by 
other shareholders who bought into the company when it was listed on the stock exchange. 
PCC Intermodal started with a strategic plan to cover all of Poland and they then 
developed sites accordingly. When they started hauling the company chemical traffic it was 
only from Brzeg Dolny, but the other terminals at Kutno, Gliwice and Frankfurt/Oder have 
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been acquired/built since. PCC group provides about 20% of PCC Intermodal’s traffic, 
although this is just from the one terminal; other terminals are all public traffic. Having the 
backing of a large, diversified group is good for stability and was good for reassuring early 
investors in PCC Intermodal. 
In 2009, PCC Intermodal was the first intermodal company on the Polish stock exchange. 
This was done in order to raise capital to build the Kutno terminal. Kutno was opened in 
2011, the same year that they took over management of the Gliwice terminal, and in 2012 
they took over management of the terminal in Frankfurt Oder. They also received an EU 
grant in 2012 to upgrade the Brzeg Dolny terminal. The Frankfurt terminal is actually owned 
by the city, but PCC has a 25-30 year lease to operate it. In addition, the city obtained EU 
funding for new cranes, so PCC have a good partnership with the city. 
 
6.2.2 Rail operations and business model 
PCC operates intermodal terminals and manages shuttles between all of these locations 
but they are not traction providers. They own about 400 wagons, mostly 80ft (for 2x 40ft), 
then 60ft and the rest 90ft (for 2x 45ft). PCC sets up the timetabled services, then runs 
tenders to sub-contract traction providers to provide the locomotive power to haul the shuttles 
between terminals. The first and last mile by road haulage is organised by the transport 
companies themselves rather than by PCC. 
Although they are not traction providers, they have shunting locos in the terminals. They 
also have a rail operation licence in Poland, but normally the external rail operator takes the 
wagon set from the gate. Handling containers at the terminal is their core business so they do 
not want to enter the traction market. Also, neutrality is one of the core principles and they do 
not want to change that by competing with rail operators.  
Their main customers are shipping lines and forwarders – only rarely are they actual 
shippers. They offer a door-to-door service, although this isperformed by sub contractors as 
they don’t own their own trucks). They have one tractor at Kutno so they can do shunts to 
Nyhof Wassink next door – see next section. So they are flexible and develop sensibly in line 
with the market. They have some leased chassis for internal operations.  
PCC offer minor services at the terminals, such cleaning and minor repairs but they are not in 
the logistics market. Their core business is terminals and shuttles, and the next important 
activity is door to door transport. Nyhof Wassink is a large company located next door to the 
Kutno terminal. They provide a lot of the traffic, which provides a good underpinning to the 
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site. Originally Nyhof Wassink was located 20km away, where they had a small terminal and 
started running intermodal services, but they didn’t want to be an intermodal operator so they 
decided to move to the new site where PCC could provide the service for them. This is a 
good business model as traffic was guaranteed at the site from the start. There is farm land 
around the Kutno terminal so there is a possibility that other firms will locate there in future. 
PCC would like to work in partnership with such firms, as they do with Nyhof Wassink, but 
they will focus on their core business which is transport. 
The core business for PCC is to remain neutral with regard to transport operators. That is 
why their customers remain transport providers rather than shippers, therefore they do not 
compete for direct custom. Additionally, they do not compete with traction providers for rail 
operations. It is the core of their business model to retain this neutrality and continue to sub-
contract rail traction, even though they do have a licence to provide traction in Poland. 
Another key aspect of their business model is that they have the backing of a parent 
company that also provides around 20% of their traffic, granting some stability. They also 
have a large customer located onsite at Kutno which underpins their investment there. 
Infrastructure limitations prevent business growth as trains cannot reach 750m on the 
Polish network because, for example, some passing loops aren’t long enough. The average 
speed on the Polish network is 25kmh even though the locos and wagons can do 100+. 
Poland has one of the highest track access charges in Europe and there is no government 
policy for intermodal transport. PCC would like some consistency and security with 
government plans for the infrastructure network so they can invest with confidence. One of 
the results of this lack of strategy is overcapacity of terminals in some locations (e.g. 5-6 
terminals in Poznan). A clear government plan could increase coordination and system-wide 
planning.  
 
6.2.3 Conclusions 
Similar to HUPAC, the PCC business model gives them the best of both worlds – they 
manage the wagons so they can control their equipment needs and ensure availability, but 
they don’t have the difficulties and risks of loco purchase and maintenance, training drivers, 
managing their hours, getting licences in each country and so on. There is an inherent 
limitation of using external traction in that it can limit flexibility, but this must be traded off 
against other factors. Another interesting aspect of the business model is that they have no 
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involvement in logistics and no direct relationship with the shippers. This is good because of 
neutrality but it means they are one step removed from the market.  
There are many positive aspects of the PCC strategy. It was a good decision to phase the 
development of the Kutno terminal, starting small then expanding, they are backed by a large 
group and have some traffic from that group. It is also a sound business model to have one 
large customer located at the site, with whom they work in partnership. They are also 
flexible, e.g. buying one tractor to do small shunts. These points can be generalised as 
positive lessons for intermodal terminal development. Also, PCC has a good strategy to serve 
the whole country, from ports to inland and they are developing one site at a time. 
 
6.3 Freightliner 
6.3.1 Company background and structure 
Freightliner was originally a division of the national UK rail operator British Rail. When 
BR was privatised in 1996, its divisions were sold separately and Freightliner was purchased 
by a management buyout. It has subsequently been bought by a private equity firm. A bulk 
division was added in 1999: Freightliner Heavy Haul. In the last decade they have also 
expanded into Poland and Australia, primarily bulk traffic, and in 2013 they bought European 
Rail Shuttle B.V, Maersk’s intermodal carrier in the Netherlands. 
 
6.3.2 Rail operations and business model 
 Freightliner is the largest intermodal rail freight operator in the UK, carrying more than 
80% of all the maritime containers that are moved by rail. This is because, due to the 
geography of the UK, the vast majority of intermodal services are port shuttles. 
Freightliner serves 14 intermodal terminals in the UK, of which they own and operate 9 
(Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Cleveland, Coatbridge, Doncaster, Leeds, Liverpool and 
Manchester), 4 in/near ports and 5 inland. Their core intermodal business  is port-hinterland 
shuttles, for which they provide the locos and wagons and take bookings directly for the slots. 
Many of these are purchased by shipping lines as hinterland transport in the UK is dominated 
by carrier haulage. 
 The company own over 75 diesel and electric locomotives and around 3,500 rail wagons. 
Their trainsets are based for the most part on 60ft flat wagons to handle a mixture of 20ft and 
40ft deepsea containers, but more recently introducing a percentage of 40ft wagons. They run 
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over 100 daily intermodal services, generally around 72 TEU capacity but up to 90 TEU 
based on 30 wagons. 
 Freightliner does not get involved in logistics and their business is simply from port 
terminal to inland terminal. They do a moderate amount of road haulage, operating 300 trucks 
but for the most part that is organised by the customer, carrier or freight forwarder. 
 The business model is based on vertical integration between terminal and rail operations 
and running their own equipment. This model is facilitated by the carrier haulage trend in the 
UK which means that the majority of each service is underwritten by a major deepsea carrier 
such as Maersk. Additional containers can then be booked on either directly by the shipper or 
via a freight forwarder or 3PL. 
 As the terminals were ex-national, some are quite old and there are issues about the lack 
of investment and whether the public sector in the UK should provide some grants for old 
terminals, as there were until recently grants available for new terminal sites if they could be 
shown to be supporting new services facilitating modal shift from road to rail. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusions 
 The vertical integration and focus on port shuttles is a strong business model. Also they 
focus on their core business and are not involved in logistics or value-added, although they do 
take bookings directly from customers. 
 
6.4 Jula and Schenker 
6.4.1 Company background and structure 
This case study is based not on a pure intermodal operator but on a cooperative joint 
venture between a large shipper and a freight forwarder to operate a specific intermodal 
route, which is now expanding to a second route.  
Jula operates in the DIY sector. As of 2014, the company has 73 department stores in 
three countries (Sweden 41, Norway 21, Poland 11) and 2,400 employees. In 2013 the 
company turnover was €0.5 billion while profits reached €57 million. All flows are 
coordinated and consolidated at the 150,000m
2
 central warehouse and distribution centre in 
Skara. The majority of incoming goods to the central warehouse consist of imported 
containers, mainly from Asia. Schenker Air and Ocean in Sweden hold the Jula key account 
and coordinates incoming container flows. 
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6.4.2 Rail operations and business model 
The initial idea for an intermodal transport service came from the municipality of 
Falköping who did a pre-study to analyze the possibilities of a rail service between the port of 
Gothenburg and Falköping. Schenker and Jula established a joint project team to realize the 
idea in January 2013. The rail operations are sub-contracted to a rail operator based on a 
tender, but the wagons were bought by the shipper Jula. The goods consist mainly of Jula’s 
imported containers from the Far East which amounts to about 10,000 TEU per year. As of 
January 2015, the train capacity is averaging 84 TEU per day. The intermodal transport 
service operates 5-6 times a week. The majority of containers are provided by Jula but they 
are also taking bookings from individual shippers. 
A critical concern in the setup has been to develop the rail shuttle in such a way that Jula 
and Schenker are flexible and independent so that the rail operator does not gain too much 
power. This is often the case as they normally own the wagons, control the timetable and the 
time-window in the container terminal at the seaport. To avoid this problem, Schenker signed 
the agreement with the port terminal operator APM Terminals and Jula  invested in wagons. 
Jula becoming a wagon owner means that they had to contract an ECM (Entity in Charge of 
Maintenance) and a maintenance provider (Swemaint and the local service provider BS 
Verkstäder).  
Schenker takes the responsibility for three main functions: bookings, accounting and 
monitoring. Besides the operating functions, Schenker also has the responsibility of 
marketing and sales of the intermodal service. Schenker and Jula continuously discuss market 
issues since the aim is for Schenker and Jula to attract complementary flows, meaning 
customers with export flows and ideally using the same shipping lines as Jula. This enables 
effective repositioning of containers and high utilisation rates on the intermodal service. This 
also means that Schenker does not merely sell capacity on the intermodal service but takes 
full responsibility of the customers’ export and import flows in order to be able to coordinate 
them.  
For the purpose of effective repositioning of empty containers, Schenker and the terminal 
operator have signed agreements with shipping lines in order for them to set up an empty 
container depot in Falköping, a process more time-consuming and challenging than expected 
according to the representatives of Schenker. Furthermore, Jula has developed their customs 
clearance process so that the goods do not need to be cleared until they reach the warehouse 
in Skara.  
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The business model is based on cooperation between Schenker and Jula, based on an 
open-book basis where both the risk and the profit on the service are shared between the two 
companies. The business model is interesting because even though the rail operations are sub-
contracted, the wagons are owned by the shipper Jula, therefore the shipper controls both the 
wagons and the goods. Additionally, the revenues received from other customers on the 
service flow to the joint partners Jula and Schenker, thus allowing the shipper Jula to cross-
subsidise their own transport costs. 
 After the initial success, the partners are planning to expand to a second route, allowing 
greater triangulation opportunities and better asset management. The new service will also be 
sub-contracted, which is interesting because it reduces profit margin of the rail operator 
compared to if they were running the two routes directly themselves in their own right. 
Schenker is also working together with the terminal operator in order to develop more 
agreements with shipping lines in hopes of establishing more container depots at the 
intermodal terminal in Falköping. Schenker focuses on attracting more shippers to the 
intermodal transport service which sometimes is time-consuming since they are often locked 
in to existing 1-2 year agreements. The goal is to reach about 25-30,000 TEU annually (fully 
loaded containers in total for both directions) within 2-3 years. Currently the service handles 
about 15,000 TEU annually, excluding empty containers. 
 
6.4.3 Conclusions 
This case demonstrates the need for a continuous improvement process that requires all 
stakeholders to remain committed to develop the service, value-added activities and 
infrastructure. The elements of entrepreneurship and trust are evident and the cooperative 
business model is crucial for the construction of a sustainable win-win context.    
The partners  now consider extending the concept to other regions and destinations; 
however, this requires the same long-term commitment and perspective on mutually 
beneficial relationships with key stakeholders such as large shippers/customers and transport 
service providers. This is currently the main challenge since few shippers are used to or 
wiling to engage in the type of cooperative business model and setup. Schenker hopes that the 
best practice the Jula case illustrates can help convince shippers and other stakeholders of the 
potential associated with the cooperative business model.   
 
7. Results and discussion 
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The key features of each case are summarised in Table 3. Freightliner operates an 
integrated model between rail services and terminals, with full management and operation of 
the rail service assets. HUPAC and PCC likewise integrate terminals and services, but they 
sub-contract the traction while owning their own wagons. The final case is an innovative 
model not involving terminals, but in which the shipper itself owns the wagons and has set up 
a kind of joint venture with a rail management operator that then sub-contracts the traction. 
Thus the cases provide different models of operational integration that reflect the 
organisational motives of the actors. 
 
Table 3. Cross-case comparison 
 HUPAC PCC Freightliner Jula & Schenker 
Terminals Own/operate the 
majority but also 
serve others 
Own/operate all of 
their terminals 
Own/operate the 
majority but also 
serve others 
Use third-party 
terminals 
Track National public National public National public National public 
Rail management HUPAC PCC Freightliner Jula & Schenker 
Rail operation 
(traction) 
Sub-contract Sub-contract Freightliner Sub-contract 
Locos Responsibility of 
sub-contractor 
Responsibility of 
sub-contractor 
Freightliner Responsibility of sub-
contractor 
Wagon owner HUPAC PCC Freightliner Jula  
Wagon asset 
specificity 
Firm specific Firm specific Firm specific Relationship specific 
Logistics No No No Yes 
Key specific 
influences on the 
business model 
Key principle is to 
remain neutral 
towards shippers 
and only serve 
transport operators 
Key principle is to 
remain neutral 
towards shippers 
and only serve 
transport operators 
Carrier haulage 
allows them to book 
up majority of 
capacity with 
shipping lines 
Jula controls majority 
of the traffic so 
reliable 
 
 
An interesting finding from the case analysis is that it is more common to outsource 
traction than wagons. One potential explanation could be that the choice to invest in wagons 
has a more integrating dimension with other stakeholders as it heavily influences the 
efficiency of all operations, including not just the service but the marshalling and loading at 
the terminals. It may also be that traction is integrated when there is no favorable option 
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available suggesting that there are well-functioning markets where deregulation has worked. 
For wagons, the decision is less related to how well the market for wagons works but more to 
the benefits of integration as explored in the theoretical approaches in this paper, such as 
control over supply, control over maintenance times and costs and the ability to create and 
then exploit a heterogeneous advantage. The next step is then to determine which of the three 
theories explains the case results. 
 TCE supports vertical integration when uncertainty, asset specificity and transaction 
frequency are high, but market transactions when they are low. This explains why a large 
operator like Freightliner has integrated terminals and services, including locos and wagons. 
It does not explain why HUPAC and PCC have decided not to operate their own traction. 
Interviewees explained the importance of neutrality with regard to customers who are 
transport providers, which is not a particular problem for Freightliner as the majority of their 
bookings come from shipping lines. The Jula and Schenker case is only for a single service, 
therefore low transaction frequency explains why they would not need to integrate with a 
terminal or a traction provider, yet this also raises the questions of why they would take the 
decision to purchase and maintain wagons. 
 Turning to RBV, this theory suggests vertical integration when greater efficiency and thus 
competitive advantage can be obtained through the use of resources such as assets or staff. 
This approach explains the choice of all four cases to purchase wagons, even while not 
integrating with traction provision. In the case of Jula and Schenker, it gives them a 
competitive advantage because Jula can use the correct wagon type for their needs as they are 
the main customer, and their open book relationship with Schenker means they are not paying 
any rent on top. Any profit that is earned through the joint venture is shared between the two 
companies, meaning that if their service is successful Jula can cross-subsidise their own 
transport costs. It also means they don’t need to be concerned with asset utilisation of 
expensive locomotives. HUPAC and PCC interviewees stated that wagon ownership enables 
them to keep maintenance in-house, thus ensuring their safety and reliability. It also reduces 
the need to split and reform wagon sets to achieve the correct composition required for their 
traffic. RBV proposes that strategically valuable resources should be kept inside the firm, 
thus explaining the decision of all four cases to purchase rail wagons and underlines the way 
in which rail wagons can be seen as relationship specific assets according to the relational 
view. 
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The RBV explanation for asset utilisation suggests not only economies of scale through 
increased firm size as a result of integration but also the production of economies of scope 
and density. These are obtained by the integration of two firms possessing unique resource 
configurations that then enable the provision of more than one kind of service, as well as 
increasing asset utilisation by adding additional routes. This applies particularly to the fourth 
case, where the joint venture between Jula and Schenker is leading to an additional route that 
will increase wagon utilisation and earn profit, again without the risk of owning and 
maintaining locomotives. This is particularly interesting because under normal circumstances 
a traction provider would compete for this new route in their own name and earn the profit 
themselves, thus generating rents from their market position. In this case, the joint venture 
will earn the rents and simply pay the traction provider a contractual rate to provide the 
service. So the decision to set up a joint venture and purchase wagons for their own flows has 
enabled a new venture in which a large shipper is indirectly becoming a rail service provider 
due to their decision to invest in a relationship specific asset. The ability to safeguard the 
asset and to use more specific types of assets, two key aspects of the relational view, are thus 
well represented in this final innovative case. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 Treating the wagon as a relationship specific asset in this paper has enabled an 
exploration of some of the key elements of successful intermodal transport; namely trust, 
learning, knowledge sharing, coordination and complementarity. Intermodal transport 
involves the coordination and cooperation of many actors, in addition to its inherent practical 
and operational complexities. In this sense the role of the wagon as a relationship specific 
asset is a microcosm of the intermodal transport system. 
Madhok and Tallmann (1998) suggest a relationship between transaction specific assets, 
drawing on TCE, and firm specific assets, drawing on RBV, while Dyer and Singh (1998) 
produced the modified version of the “relationship specific asset”. The findings in this paper 
show that the wagon purchase provides an important signal of commitment. It is more than 
simply transaction specific (TCE) because it is a long-term action that is not easy to reverse at 
short notice, and in particular has high specificity with regard to a particular traffic flow. 
Similarly, wagons can be more than firm specific (RBV), in cases where more than one firm 
is involved; in three of the four cases, the traction is provided by another company who will 
be hauling the wagons of the case company. Therefore there is a clear relationship element, 
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involving trust and learning within a collaborative environment, essential for the relational 
view (Rossiter Hofer et al., 2014).  
Important management implications can be derived from the research findings presented 
in this paper, based on an understanding of how treating wagons as relationship specific 
assets can inform strategy. A key tenet of RBV is that a resource should not be easily 
obtained or replicated by competitors, therefore the strategy selected by management must 
identify first, how to create a competitive advantage through wagon purchase and, second, 
how to maintain it. Wagons in themselves are not unique or rare (depending on the type), but 
the strategic decision is whether the operator should own and maintain their own wagons or 
pay the traction provider to provide not only the locomotive but the full wagon set. Owning 
their own wagon sets provides the benefits described earlier regarding control and 
maintenance without the larger risks of locomotive ownership and operation, such as staff 
training and management; moreover, the sub-contracted traction provider cannot easily 
compete on the route because the company has already won the route and manages the traffic, 
in addition to the effect this strategy would have on the existing business relationship. 
Therefore, the combination of terminals and wagons without traction procures an advantage 
for three of the four case companies not available if they integrated terminals, wagons and 
traction. As shown by case three, the latter model could give superior advantage in the right 
circumstances, but the market and geography must be suitable. 
The analysis in this paper has focused on the relationship specific asset in order to enable 
a locus of comparison between the three theories, but a full exposition of the relational view 
includes knowledge sharing routines and the complementarity of both resources and 
capabilities between partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998); these have been found to be present in 
all four cases, even if it is primarily the fourth case that illustrates the relationship specific 
asset most clearly. More importantly, the findings reveal that wagon ownership is not only a 
good indicator of the level of vertical cooperation, but it also signals that the transport service 
itself is recognized as part of the core business of the relationship. Thus the organisational 
decision is not related purely to integration of organisations but integration of processes 
through the purchase of assets that will be used to produce a service. This is particularly 
interesting in the fourth case where a shipper and a freight forwarder operate a joint service 
on an open book basis.  
Given the policy context of modal shift from road to rail and the many challenges already 
identified in previous research, future research should examine how such innovative business 
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models can overcome these barriers. The generalisability of these findings to other sectors 
also lies in this definition of new cooperative business models, which are found not just in the 
intermodal sector, but speak to the broader theoretical discussion of the use of assets, vertical 
integration and cooperation between stakeholders and the production of joint services in any 
business sector. Such innovative approaches raise questions as to whether transport service 
provision is the core business of the rail operator, the traction provider, the wagon owner, the 
3PL or even the large shipper. This paper thus opens for future research the redefinition of 
transport as a core business and how the search to increase efficiency and lower costs can be 
achieved through the use of not just a transaction specific or firm specific but relationship 
specific asset. Future work in transport and logistics as well as other sectors can explore and 
classify the best way to design and execute such business models in order to obtain the 
potential benefits. 
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